LEWIS_FMT2.DOC

11/13/01 3:06 PM

NOTE
THE EXPLOITATION OF TRUST:
THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT
PRIVILEGE IN ALASKA AS
APPLIED TO PRISON GROUP
THERAPY
This Note examines the application of the psychotherapistpatient privilege under Rule 504 of the Alaska Rules of Evidence. The Note argues that the psychotherapist-patient
privilege should be extended in Alaska to include communications made during prison group therapy. It begins with
a general discussion of privileges and the psychotherapistpatient privilege in Alaska. It then argues, with reference to
a leading Alaska Court of Appeals case, Beaver v. State,
that the psychotherapist-patient privilege should apply to
prison group therapy as a means of facilitating trust and rehabilitation in prison group therapy.
The veneer of social trust is often thin. As lies spread—by
imitation, or in retaliation, or to forestall suspected deception—trust is damaged. Yet trust is a social good to be
protected just as much as the air we breathe or the water
we drink. When it is damaged, the community as a whole
suffers; and when it is destroyed, societies falter and collapse.
1
—Sissela Bok

Copyright © 2001 by Christina L. Lewis. This Note is also available on the Internet at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/18ALRLewis.
The author would like to thank Professor Andrew Taslitz of Howard University
for his help on this Note. The author notes that any errors in the work are the
author’s own and do not reflect on contributors to this effort.
1. Christopher Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext, and Trickery: Investigative Lies by
the Police, 76 OR. L. REV. 775, 790 (1997) (quoting SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL
CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 28 (1978)).
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1997, the Alaska Court of Appeals decided Beaver v. State,2
holding that communications made by an adjudicated juvenile sex
offender, Patrick Beaver, were admissible as evidence even though
the statements were made during group therapy at a juvenile cor3
rectional facility. When sentencing Beaver, the court relied on
statements he made during his participation in rehabilitative group
4
therapy sessions. These statements divulged past experiences and
5
personal propensity to commit sexual abuse. The court concluded
that the statements could be admitted at a subsequent hearing
without violating Beaver’s Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination since he failed to affirmatively assert his right, even
after he received a warning that his statements could be used
6
against him. The court reasoned that participation in a prison rehabilitation group is voluntary, and therefore any statements made
7
during the session constitute voluntary confessions.
Since neither side referenced or argued the psychotherapistpatient privilege, the court did not consider the protections afforded by the privilege. This Note asserts that an additional argument should have been made that Patrick Beaver’s statements
were protected by the psychotherapist-patient privilege as set forth
in Rule 504 of the Alaska Rules of Evidence. Additionally, this
Note contends that the argument should have been raised and indeed, been successful. In light of Rule 504, allowing the statements
into evidence was a conspicuous violation of Patrick Beaver’s evidentiary rights.
There is no existing judicial opinion or legal precedent in
Alaska interpreting Rule 504 in the context of group therapy. The
only guidance provided is a commentary to the Rule, stating that
“[p]articipants in group therapy programs in the presence of a psychotherapist may be covered under the definition of ‘confidential
8
communication.’” The sentence is followed by a citation to an article by Wayne Cross entitled “Privileged Communications Be9
tween Participants in Group Psychotherapy.” This Note asserts
that the reference in the Rule to the Cross article supports an ar2. 933 P.2d 1178 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
3. Id. at 1186.
4. Id. at 1180.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1181-82.
7. Id. at 1183.
8. ALASKA R. EVID. 504 cmt. (2000).
9. Wayne Cross, Privileged Communications Between Participants in Group
Psychotherapy, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER (1970).
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gument for the expansion in Alaska of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege to cover group therapy.
The fact pattern of the Beaver case supports the contention
that Alaska should apply the psychotherapist-patient privilege to
prison group therapy sessions. This Note begins by discussing
privileges generally and then explores the dynamics of the psychotherapist-patient privilege specifically. The Note then examines
the meaning and purpose of Rule 504 of the Alaska Rules of Evidence and concludes that prison group therapy sessions should be
included within the scope of the Rule.
II. THE ESSENCE OF PRIVILEGES GENERALLY AND THE NATURE
OF THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE
A. Privileges Generally
Generally, a privilege permits the non-disclosure of certain in10
formation by a witness in civil or criminal litigation. A privilege
may be invoked outside the courtroom, in matters such as pretrial
discovery requests and attempts to compel testimony, as well as
11
during the trial itself.
Privileges are created to preserve values and relationships, the
benefits of which are believed to outweigh the need for the evi12
dence at trial. Privileges are based on the belief that some relationships are necessarily founded on confidentiality and the supposition that the individual should sometimes be protected from
13
intrusions by the government and the courts. Although privileges
inevitably result in the suppression of otherwise probative evidence, the desideratum of a “perfect trial” is outweighed by the
14
relationships and societal values that privileges preserve.
In deciding whether a privilege exists, scholars often refer to
the four-part test developed by Dean John Wigmore of Northwest15
ern University School of Law. In order to warrant inclusion in a

10. STEVEN I. FRIEDLAND ET AL., EVIDENCE LAW AND PRACTICE 646 (2000).
11. Id. at 647.
12. Id.
13. S. Kay McNab, Note, Criticizing the Self-Criticism Privilege, 1987 U. ILL.
L. REV. 675, 676-77 (1987).
14. GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 9.1, at
381 (2d ed. 1987).
15. RALPH
SLOVENKO,
PSYCHOTHERAPY,
CONFIDENTIALITY,
AND
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION 10 (1966). “The first edition of Wigmore’s work on
evidence appeared in 1904, the second in 1923, and the third in 1940.” Id at 39.
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class of privileged communications, the communication must meet
these four criteria:
(1) Does the communication in the usual circumstances of the
given professional relation originate in a confidence that it will
not be disclosed? (2) Is the inviolability of that confidence essential to the achievement of the purpose of the relationship?
(3) Is the relation one that should be fostered? (4) Is the expected injury to the relation, through fear of later disclosure,
greater than
the expected benefit to justice in obtaining the tes16
timony?

Both federal and state legislatures consider these four factors
in deciding whether a privilege exists. The type of evidence protected by privileges, however, may vary among different states, and
17
between federal and state courts. These differences arise in part
from the various methods of creating a privilege—through the
adoption of common law, by legislative acts, and in the recognition
18
of constitutional rights. The Federal Rules of Evidence do little
to promote uniformity. Although Congress enumerated a list of
19
privileges included in the “Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence,”
Rule 501 ultimately replaced these rules, providing that all privileges are governed “by the principles of the common law as they
may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of
20
reason and experience.”
Many states have adopted privileges similar to those specified
in the Proposed Rules, but almost all have adjusted the wording or
21
added and subtracted from the provisions. The legislatures of
most states have codified the privileges developed in common law
22
in various forms.

16. Id. at 10.
17. FRIEDLAND ET AL., supra note 10, at 647.
18. Id. at 648. Constitutional privileges include the privilege against selfincrimination as set forth in the Fifth Amendment and the implied privilege of executive immunity. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend V.
19. FRIEDLAND ET AL., supra note 10, at 641-45. The Proposed Rules of Evidence include the following: Rule 503, lawyer-client privilege; Rule 504, psychotherapist-patient privilege; Rule 505, husband-wife privilege; Rule 506, communications to clergymen (not enacted); Rule 507, privilege to refuse to disclose
political vote (not enacted); Rule 508, trade secrets (not enacted), Rule 509, secrets of state and other official information (not enacted); Rule 510, identity of
informer (not enacted). Id.
20. LILLY, supra note 14, at 384.
21. Id. at 385. Although the state laws are not necessarily uniform, Lilly indicates that the laws are generally consistent. Id.
22. FRIEDLAND ET AL., supra note 10, at 648.
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Neither federal nor state privileges are automatic or fixed. By
contrast, privileges can be waived both impliedly and expressly.
Implied waivers may occur when protected information is communicated to a third party; express waivers may occur when individuals overtly decline to invoke the privilege, such as through a signed
23
writing. Express waivers must be made “voluntarily, knowingly
24
and intelligently.” The waiver must occur in the absence of any
25
threat, coercion or duress.
B. The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege
The psychotherapist-patient privilege was first recognized in
federal courts after the pioneering decision by the United States
26
Supreme Court in Jaffee v. Redmond. In Jaffee, the court suppressed statements made by a police officer to her social worker in
27
a civil action that occurred after the officer shot and killed a man.
The court held that the psychotherapist-patient privilege falls under Rule 501 because such a privilege serves a “public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all ra28
The case extended the
tional means for ascertaining truth.”
privilege from communications to licensed psychiatrists and psychologists to confidential communications made to licensed social
workers in the course of psychotherapy, and the court reasoned
29
that all of these have significant roles in mental health treatment.
The court highlighted the utilitarian benefit of the psychotherapistpatient privilege, stating that it “serves the public interest by facilitating the provision of appropriate treatment for individuals suffering the effects of a mental or emotional problem. The mental
health of our citizenry, no less than its physical health, is a public
30
good of transcendent importance.”
Two justifications for the psychotherapist-patient privilege
31
exist today. The first is the fundamental recognition of a patient’s

23. Id. at 649.
24. Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 572 (1987) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966)).
25. Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 801-02 (1970).
26. 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
27. Id. at 5.
28. Id. at 15 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980)).
29. Id. at 15-16.
30. Id. at 11.
31. PAUL M. SMITH, The Physician-Patient, Psychotherapist-Patient and Related Privileges, in TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES 377, 382 (Scott N. Stone & Ronald S.
Liebman eds., 1983).
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interest in the privacy of therapeutic matters.32 The second is based
on the belief that confidentiality is essential to the practice and ef33
ficacy of psychotherapy. In 1960, the Group for the Advancement
of Psychiatry stated that “[a]mong physicians, the psychiatrist has a
special need to maintain confidentiality. His capacity to help his
patients is completely dependent upon their willingness and ability
34
to talk freely.” Psychologists as early as Freud recognized that
“[t]he whole undertaking becomes lost [labor] if a single concession
35
is made to secrecy.” Communications are likely to be repressed if
patients are concerned that their words may be used against them
36
in a future lawsuit.
The psychotherapist-patient privilege has been codified in
37
some form by all 50 states and the District of Columbia. The general public believes that communications to a therapist are confidential, that confidentiality is essential to the achievement of the
purpose of the relationship, and that its benefits outweigh the in38
jury to justice. It has been suggested that the confidentiality provided by the psychotherapist-patient privilege may be even more
important than that ensured by the doctor-patient privilege since
disclosure of private thoughts can be even more painful to the indi39
vidual than disclosure of certain physical ailments. The psychotherapist-patient privilege has been recognized as a class of protected communication under the Wigmore test because of the
importance of complete communication in psychotherapy, the
natural resistance of individuals to fully disclose information, and
the individual’s magnified reluctance to make full disclosures when
40
there is a threat of future criminal prosecution.
C. The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege and Group Therapy
Group therapy is an increasingly common method of treating
41
patients. As in individual treatment, members of the group di32. Id.
33. Ralph Slovenko, Foreword to DANIEL W. SHUMAN & MYRON F. WEINER,
THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION vii
(1987).
34. Id.
35. Id. (quoting Freud).
36. SLOVENKO, supra note 15, at 41.
37. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 12 (1996).
38. SLOVENKO, supra note 15, at 40-50 (arguing that the psychotherapistpatient privilege passes the four-part Wigmore test).
39. SMITH, supra note 31, at 386.
40. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10; see also SMITH, supra note 31, at 386.
41. See SLOVENKO, supra note 15, at 119.
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vulge past experiences, emotions, and thoughts to both the trained
therapist and the other members of the group.42 Dr. Jacob L. Moreno introduced group therapy as a method of treating patients in
43
the United States during the 1930s. Today, group therapy is often
the preferred mode of treatment by individuals who feel that the
interaction among group members has a therapeutic effect unavail44
able in individual psychotherapy.
There are two theoretical approaches to group therapy. The
first concerns itself with the separate individuals of the group, employing the group as a medium by which the therapist can deal with
45
each individual patient more effectively. Individual patients feel
freer to express their thoughts because they are in a setting similar
to the real world, but without societal constraints, and are free to
46
discuss their thoughts and emotions with impunity. The second
approach views the group as one individual, a functioning social
47
unit which works together to solve the group’s problems. Both
approaches require each member of the group to become a thera48
peutic agent of the others.
Although all 50 states have recognized the psychotherapistpatient privilege for individual therapy, not all explicitly extend the
49
privilege to group therapy. Some states have assumed an expansive privilege, covering both individual and group therapy, while
50
other state statutes are silent on the issue of group therapy.

42. Jessica G. Weiner, “And the Wisdom to Know the Difference”: Confidentiality vs. Privilege in the Self-Help Setting, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 243, 249-50 (1995).
43. Cross, supra note 9, at 191 n.3.
44. SAMUEL KNAPP & LEON VANDECREEK, PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS IN
THE MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONS 75 (1987).
45. Id.
46. See id.
47. Cross, supra note 9, at 196.
48. See id.
49. See KNAPP, supra note 44, at 75.
50. Id. Although a comprehensive list of states that protect communications
under the psychotherapist-patient privilege offered in group therapy has never
been compiled, the research for this Note revealed that group therapy is protected
by the privilege in California, Colorado, Kansas, Minnesota, and New Jersey. For
the specific provisions, see part VI of this Note.
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III. ALASKA LAW AND THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT
PRIVILEGE
A. The General Privilege
Alaska codified the psychotherapist-patient privilege in Rule
51
504 of the Alaska Rules of Evidence. The privilege is fairly expansive, including statements to a person who the patient had reasonable grounds to believe was a physician, psychotherapist, or
52
psychologist. The first case to address the privilege was Allred v.
53
State, in which the Alaska Supreme Court refused to consider
statements made by a defendant to a psychotherapist in a first54
degree murder case. The court evaluated Professor Wigmore’s
four factors to determine whether a privilege existed, and held that
55
the psychotherapeutic relationship satisfied each of the factors.
The Court noted that a patient’s statements to a therapist are “inherently confidential” and that “confidence is essential to achieve56
ment of the psychotherapeutic goal.” The court did not extend
the privilege to therapists who are not licensed psychologists or
psychiatrists, and extended it only to those treatments that “require
57
confidentiality for [their] success.”
The psychotherapist-patient privilege was examined again by
58
the Alaska Court of Appeals in State v. Wetherhorn. The court
held that Alaska Statutes section 47.67.060 abrogated the psychotherapist-patient privilege to communications with psychologists in
59
child abuse civil trials. However, the court noted that the statute
60
did not apply to criminal proceedings. The court emphasized the
sensitivity of criminal cases and held that the privilege should apply
61
more narrowly in criminal proceedings than in civil cases.
B. Group Therapy
Despite the distinctions made between licensed practitioners
and counselors, and between civil and criminal proceedings, the

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

ALASKA R. EVID. 504 (2000).
Id. at 504(a)(3).
554 P.2d 411 (Alaska 1976).
Id. at 422.
Id. at 417.
Id.
Id. at 420.
683 P.2d 269 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).
Id. at 277.
Id.
Id. at 281.
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scope of the privilege with regard to group therapy in Alaska is still
brimming with ambiguity. The commentary to Rule 504 states that
“participants in group therapy programs in the presence of a psychotherapist may be covered under the definition of ‘confidential
62
communication.’” There is no other reference to group therapy in
the rule and the only clarification offered is a citation to a 1970 article by Wayne Cross in a journal entitled Law and the Social Or63
der. Since the commentary to Rule 504 offers no other supportive
citations, it suggests that the Cross article is the appropriate
authority to consult in determining when group therapy should be
included under the psychotherapist-patient privilege.
In his article, Cross explores the dynamics of group therapy,
stating that “[the] reliance on third parties, which is the central feature of group therapy, acquires obvious significance when one attempts an evaluation of the propriety of granting a privilege to
64
group communications.” Dr. Jacob L. Moreno, the pioneer of
group therapy in the United States, is mentioned several times in
65
the article. Dr. Moreno believed that uninhibited expression was
66
essential to the success of group therapy. Cross elaborates on Dr.
Moreno’s position writing that “[n]o group participant would make
himself vulnerable . . . by placing his most secret thoughts before
67
the group, unless he could be assured of confidentiality.” Cross
notes that many patients are likely to discontinue therapy and
many others will be unwilling to make necessary contributions to
68
the group if trust is not established.
Cross emphasizes the need for trust in group therapy where
individuals feel particularly vulnerable. A group therapist must set
a goal of helping the participants overcome anxieties because it is
necessary to collapse the natural resistance of those who feel vul69
nerable. According to Cross, the task would be insurmountable if
the group members were aware that all communications could be
70
disclosed at a later time.
Lastly, Cross advocates expanding the psychotherapist-patient
privilege to group therapy. He states that society, in accord with
public policy, should encourage the treatment of the mentally ill
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

ALASKA R. EVID. 504(a)(4) cmt. (2000) (emphasis added).
Cross, supra note 9.
Cross, supra note 9, at 197.
Id. at 198.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 198-99.
Id. at 199.
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and the emotionally troubled.71 Society should support group therapy because the process focuses on helping individuals enhance
their relationships with their outside environment, thus improving
72
society as a whole. Cross argues that society should be even more
interested in protecting group therapy than individual therapy because group therapy explores the individual’s social relationships,
and can better treat problems in advance of any future harm to
73
those relationships. This rationale may be of particular relevance
with regard to individuals seeking treatment within a correctional
setting because incarceration implies noncompliance with social
norms. Because group therapy is necessary for the treatment of
individuals for both intrinsic and pragmatic reasons, Cross argues
that society should foster the maintenance and development of
74
group relationships.
Since the commentary to Alaska Rule 504 does not reference
any other authority besides the Cross article, the drafters of Rule
504 must have intended for the Cross article to be the governing
authority in determining whether group therapy should be included
within Alaska’s psychotherapist-patient privilege. As stated above,
the Cross article ardently advocates for the extension of the privilege to group therapy, especially when there is a particularly vulnerable population whose progress depends on confidentiality.
IV. GROUP THERAPY IN THE PRISON SYSTEM
A. The Alaska Goal of Rehabilitation
The fact pattern of the Beaver case serves as an interesting basis on which to examine the benefits of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege for individuals participating in group therapy in prison in
Alaska. Beaver made his statements during group therapy in a juvenile correctional facility. This is precisely the type of setting for
which Cross asserts the importance of confidentiality.
Nowhere is the psychotherapist-patient privilege more essential than in the context of prison group therapy. The prison population is filled with individuals wary of admitting to past experi75
The individuals are particularly vulnerable to the
ences.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id. at 200.
Id.
Id.
See SLOVENKO, supra note 15, at 128. Slovenko states:
[P]risoners are usually distrusting souls. They feel there is no
privacy or confidence, and so they do not even want to talk to a
therapist, individually or in a group. The therapeutic situation
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consequences of revealing personal information, an issue of singular importance because they are arguably the population most in
need of the rehabilitation that therapy may help provide. Since
prisoners are generally more distrustful than the average individual, it is essential that the therapist demonstrate that she or he is
76
trustworthy. Some prison authorities have observed the reluctance of prisoners to trust other individuals, and feel that betraying
such hard-earned trust would undermine the efficacy of group
77
therapy altogether. When asked his opinion on the subject, one
prison administrator asserted, “It is my personal conviction that it
is not the role of the psychiatrist to uncover . . . information under
the guise of therapy, if he expects to expose it to the warden. I
cannot help feeling that disclosure under these circumstances is
78
sort of a ‘psychological entrapment.’”
The efficacy of group therapy should be of particular value in
Alaska because both the Alaska legislature and the Alaska judiciary have emphasized the importance of rehabilitation among the
79
convicted. In Hansen v. State, the Alaska Supreme Court stated
that “[t]he twin goals of penal administration in Alaska, reformation of the offender and the need to protect the public would be
best served by a sentence that accommodates treatment as well as
80
protects society and reaffirms societal norms.” Article I, section
12 of the Alaska Constitution also states that “multiple goals encompassed within these broad constitutional standards include rehabilitation of the offender into a noncriminal member of soci81
ety.”

hopefully will demonstrate to the prisoner that not all persons
are to be mistrusted. Confidentiality is of utmost importance
when treating individuals who are basically distrustful of others.
Id.
76. See id. at 128.
77. Id. at 129. Norman Fenton, a counselor with extensive experience in
leading group therapy sessions in prison states:
It is obvious that if a group leader reported unfavorably on an
inmate, the feelings that would arise among others in the group,
even though they agreed with the appraisal, might undermine
the group counseling program. The spontaneity of the procedure would be lost after a report of any kind from the group
leader.
Id.
78. Id.
79. 582 P.2d 1041 (Alaska 1978).
80. Id. at 1047 (quoting Mattern v. State, 500 P.2d 228, 235 (Alaska 1972)).
81. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 12.
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Article I, section 12 of the Alaska Constitution serves as the
basis for the predominant Alaska case law. The Alaska Constitution consistently emphasizes the dual goals of protection of the
82
public and rehabilitation of the criminal. The Alaska Constitution
has been interpreted as granting incarcerated inmates the right to
83
access rehabilitative programs. The legislature acted accordingly,
passing Alaska Statutes section 33.30.020, requiring “programs for
84
the treatment, care, rehabilitation and reformation of prisoners.”
The Alaska Supreme Court limited this right significantly in Rust v.
State, holding that the right to psychiatric care depends upon the
determination of a physician or other health care provider that a
prisoner exhibits a serious disease or injury, and that the disease is
85
curable. Despite this limitation, the argument for the protection
of prison therapy groups is strengthened by the analysis of the
Alaska Supreme Court in Rust. After Rust, prisoners who are
granted access to psychiatric care are likely to be those who are
considered treatable. Since most inmates who are allowed access
to psychological and psychiatric care are treatable, an effective
means of providing care is in the best interest of both the prisoner
and society. Although Alaska Statutes section 33.30.020 has been
repealed, it is important to evaluate the limitations imposed by
Rust in the event that Article I, section 12 of the Alaska Constitution is interpreted as having similar confines.
B. Ethical and Economic Benefits of Rehabilitation
Rehabilitation is a means of reducing crime induced by the pa86
thologies of individual offenders. The normative argument for
rehabilitation generally focuses on the rights of prisoners. The
Alaska Constitution actualizes this normative view in Article I, section 12: “Criminal administration shall be based upon the following: the need for protecting the public, community condemnation
of the offender, the rights of victims of crimes, restitution from the

82. Nelson v. State, 619 P.2d 480, 481 (Alaska Ct. App. 1980).
83. Smith v. State, 790 P.2d 1352, 1354 (Alaska 1990).
84. Rust v. State, 582 P.2d 134, 143 (Alaska 1978) (quoting ALASKA STAT. §
33.30.020 (repealed 1986)). Although Alaska Statutes section 33.30.020 has since
been repealed, Alaska courts still interpret the Alaska Constitution as providing a
fundamental right to rehabilitation. See Brandon v. State, Dep’t of Corrs., 938
P.2d 1029, 1032 (Alaska 1997) (stating “[t]he Department of Corrections correctly
concedes that there is a fundamental right to rehabilitation” in Alaska Constitution, Article I, section 12).
85. Rust, 582 P.2d at 143.
86. RICHARD J. BONNIE ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 27 (1997).
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offender, and the principle of reformation.”87 The Alaska Constitution does not place prisoners’ rights above retributive punishment,
88
but classifies the two values as equal in importance.
Critics of the retributive model censure analyses of the
89
costs/benefits of incarceration versus rehabilitation. Perhaps in an
ideal society, the costs of rehabilitating prisoners would be a concern secondary to the normative goal of helping inmates become
better members of society. However, since fiscal concerns are often in the forefront of policy decisions, advocates of rehabilitation
are beginning to replace normative arguments with economic ones.
The current cost of maintaining prisoners is compounded by a
90
high recidivism rate. Since 1998, almost 1,600 prisoners are re91
The state of
leased each day from state and federal prisons.
Alaska is not immune. The Alaska prison system has an 87% re92
cidivism rate. In other words, almost nine out of ten persons who
are placed in the custody of the Alaska Department of Corrections
93
will return to prison once released from custody. Seemingly, incarceration is not a sufficient deterrent for a majority of former
inmates. The high percentage of rearrests combined with the con-

87. ALASKA CONST. art. I, §12.
88. See id.; see also State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441, 444 (Alaska 1970).
Within the ambit of this constitutional phraseology are found
the objectives of rehabilitation of the offender into a noncriminal member of society, isolation of the offender from society to
prevent criminal conduct during the period of confinement, deterrence of the offender himself after his release from confinement or other penological treatment, as well as deterrence of
other members of the community who might possess tendencies
toward criminal conduct similar to that of the offender, and
community condemnation of the individual offender, or in
other words, reaffirmation of societal norms for the purpose of
maintaining respect for the norms themselves.
Chaney, 477 P.2d at 444.
89. See ANN CHIIH LIN, REFORM IN THE MAKING: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
SOCIAL POLICY IN PRISON 19 (2000); see also Michael K. Greene, Show Me the
Money! Should Taxpayer Funds Be Used to Educate Prisoners Under the Guise of
Reducing Recidivism?, 24 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 173 (1998)
(arguing that taxpayer money should not be spent on the rehabilitation of prisoners).
90. See LIN, supra note 89, at 3.
91. The Sentencing Project, at http://www.sentencingproject.org/brief/
pub1036.pdf.
92. Anthony Lee Brown, From the Inside, at http://www.eclectica.org/v2n4/
inside.html.
93. Id.
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stant influx of new prisoners causes problems of overcrowding and
an inflated prison population.94 The rising prison population will
require either increased spending to build more prisons or the re95
lease of prisoners before their sentences have ended.
Simply avoiding recidivism does not make a former prisoner a
productive member of society. In addition to the cost of the revolving door in the current prison system, studies show that those
prisoners who manage to stay out of prison are not self-sufficient.
Between 1984 and 1987, only 63% of individuals released from
96
federal prison were employed after one year. Effective rehabilitative and vocational programs are a means of combating the fiscal
burdens that arise from maintaining repeat offenders and caring for
prisoners who lack the skills and emotional faculties to find employment upon their release.
Retribution and public safety undoubtedly play meaningful
roles in prison sentencing. This Note is not advocating a weak
stance on justice—prisoners should be confined when they have
committed an illegal act. A policy facilitating rehabilitation does
not mean shorter sentences. Rather, rehabilitation is a means of
making a responsible effort to return prisoners to society as productive citizens. If the Alaska prison system has an effective rehabilitation program, recidivism may be reduced, saving the state
money. Since confidentiality is absolutely necessary for effective
rehabilitation, the psychotherapist-patient privilege should be extended to cover group therapy sessions in a prison setting for both
normative and fiscal reasons.
Neither justice nor the goal of rehabilitation is furthered by
the absence of a psychotherapist-patient privilege. Opponents of
extending the psychotherapist-patient privilege so that group therapy in prison can be truly effective may emphasize the importance
of discovering the truth, which may be lost by the exclusion of
statements made by a prisoner in group therapy. However, when
prisoners are not assured of confidentiality, they are deterred from
participating in group therapy altogether. Prisoners will not share
confidential communications with the therapist, ensuring that their
states of mind will remain hidden from the therapist and society.
The statements are just as unavailable to the justice system if prisoners do not participate in group therapy as they are if the prison97
ers’ statements are protected by the privilege.

94.
95.
96.
97.

LIN, supra note 89, at 4.
Id.
Id.
See Weiner, supra note 42, at 291-92.
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V. THE TENOR OF TRUST
A. The Importance of Trust in Effective Rehabilitation
The psychotherapist-patient privilege is built on a principle of
trust. The efficacy of therapy depends upon the individual’s ability
98
to trust the therapist. Similarly, the success of group therapy depends upon each individual’s ability to trust the therapist and the
99
other members of the group. As a result, therapy sessions are
structured to make individuals feel secure so that they are less
likely to conceal vulnerabilities. The therapist attempts to provide
an environment that feels confidential, encouraging each individual
to share secrets, memories, and emotions. As a result of the intimate nature of group therapy, individuals commonly assume that
their communications will not be disclosed outside of the group,
even if individuals are not assured that their statements will remain
100
confidential.
Betrayal of trust, even when the trust is misplaced, does not
further the policy goal of rehabilitation. When statements are used
against a prisoner in subsequent proceedings, there is a twofold deterrent to rehabilitation: first, other prisoners will not participate in
rehabilitation programs lest their statements be treated as voluntary confessions; second, the effectiveness of the therapy session on
those who do participate will be minimal since the individuals will
not feel free to disclose incriminating information. Simply stated,
free communication is essential to effective group therapy, and it is
101
lost under threat of punitive penalty.
B. Reciprocal Trust Between the Citizenry and the State
The trust endangered by the disclosure of confidential communications reaches beyond prisoners and therapists. There is also
a threat of diminished trust between the government and the citizenry. In an article on the Fourth Amendment, Scott Sundby de102
fines trust in the context of a constitutional value. He wrote that
“government action draws its legitimacy from the trust that the

98. See Cross, supra note 9, at 198 (“The therapeutic virtue of groups lies in
their potential for uninhibited expression.”).
99. Id. (“It would seem that a mutual trust is inherent in the sort of multilateral soul-baring that occurs in group sessions. No group participant would make
himself vulnerable . . . unless he could be assured of confidentiality.”).
100. Weiner, supra note 42, at 247.
101. Cross, supra note 9, at 198.
102. Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman”’s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual
Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751 (1994).
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electorate places in its representatives by choosing them to govern.”103 To him, this trust between the electorate and the government is imperiled when the government endangers the citizenry’s
104
ability to give its consent in an “informed and free manner.”
Sundby argues that the role of trust is reciprocal, and that its
existence is essential for citizens to feel that they have the opportu105
nity to participate meaningfully in society. Those who feel that
the government does not recognize their individual beliefs and
concerns perceive the government as lacking legitimacy, resulting
106
in an increased feeling of alienation. Trust diminishes when the
government acts coercively, deceitfully or contrary to promulgated
public policy. Citizens elect officials for the purposes of executing
constitutional and legislative decrees fairly and equitably.
In an article evaluating deceptive tactics used by law enforcement officials, Christopher Slobogin concluded that
routine deceit coarsens the liar, increases the likelihood of exposure, and when exposed, maximizes the loss of trust. When the
deceptive practice is carried out by an agent of the government,
it is even more reprehensible, both because the liar wields tremendous
power and because government requires trust to be ef107
fective.

Margaret Paris also advocates for rules against deceitful tactics
108
used in interrogations of suspects. Paris emphasizes the government’s role in inculcating values, contending that citizens mimic
those values upheld by the government, making trustworthy be109
havior exceptionally important. She asserts that the role of trust
is even more essential in the criminal process and advocates stan110
dard legal rules that guide governmental agents. Furthermore,
she states that establishing legal rules minimizes the discretion of
governmental agents, ensuring that interrogatories will be executed
111
fairly and in accordance with public policy. Finally, Paris argues

103. Id. at 1777.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1778.
106. Id. at 1779.
107. Christopher Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext, and Trickery: Investigative Lies by
the Police, 76 OR. L. REV. 775, 815 (1997). The author explores the nature of investigative lies and deception, employing the work of moral philosopher Sissela
Bok and her framework for evaluating deception as the basis for his analysis.
108. Margaret L. Paris, Trust, Lies, and Interrogation, 3 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L.
3, 7 (1995).
109. Id. at 31.
110. Id. at 6-7.
111. Id. at 6.
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that standard legal rules may reduce costs associated with obtaining
and monitoring the trust of the citizenry.112
Just as there should be legal rules prohibiting the use of lies
and deception during interrogations, so should legal rules exist to
facilitate trust inside the prison walls. If society perceives the government as acting deceitfully, and contrary to the stated goals of
the state constitution, the general trust of the government is diminished. The government should be viewed by the citizenry as an
enforcer of public policy, not as an infringer of societal values. Rehabilitation is an enumerated goal of the state, and the citizenry
trusts the government to carry out its purported goal truthfully,
diligently, and free of suspicion or coercion. Evidentiary privileges
that further Alaska’s goal of rehabilitation will promote the citizenry’s trust that the government will carry out constitutional policies effectively. By contrast, if the government undermines constitutional mandates, especially by divulging communications that are
perceived to be confidential, the citizenry will view the government
as an entity of impropriety, replacing trust with dissatisfaction and
suspicion.
A particularity to the Beaver case may provide fuel to critics.
In Beaver, the defendant was allegedly warned that his statements
113
could be used against him in future proceedings. There is a legitimate question regarding how the use of the statements against
Beaver could inspire distrust in the government if Beaver was told
that they could be used against him. His awareness of this possibility normally would constitute a waiver of any privilege and
would be sufficient to allow his statements into evidence. How114
ever, a waiver must not fall in the wake of duress or coercion.
The prison staff where Beaver was incarcerated encouraged him to
rehabilitate, but only if he willingly signed a waiver acknowledging
115
that his statements could be used against him. In fact, the court
emphasized that Beaver was “not compelled to make incriminatory
116
A
disclosures (and [was] in fact warned against doing so).”
warning of this sort is tantamount to giving a prisoner a choice between attempting to rehabilitate meaningfully and effectively or
not making an effort at rehabilitation at all. An ultimatum of this
sort not only resembles coercion, it further impedes the goal of ef117
fective rehabilitation as established by the Alaska Constitution.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 41-43.
Beaver, 933 P.2d 1179, 1180 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 794 (1970).
Beaver, 933 P.2d at 1180.
Id. at 1182.
See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 12.
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Beaver was placed in group therapy, asked to speak about personal
events and emotions, and asked to listen to others do the same.
Despite the context in which his statements were made, his efforts
118
to rehabilitate were used against him in another proceeding.
If meaningful trust between prisoners and the therapist is to be
established, the psychotherapist-patient privilege should not be so
easily waived. First, an ultimatum that a prisoner must waive his
rights to confidentiality before participating in group therapy undermines the efficacy of rehabilitation by discouraging participation and impeding open communication. Second, since prisoners
are encouraged to share in group therapy, and the therapist operates by breaking down any resistance to open communication, using statements made in group therapy in future proceedings is coercive, contrary to public policy, and improper. The Alaska
Constitution delineates rehabilitation as a laudable goal of the
prison system, and the citizenry trusts that the government will facilitate constitutional goals. The trust of the body politic is damaged when therapy sessions are used as a forum to uncover evidence of criminality rather than as a means to effectuate
rehabilitation.
An extension of the psychotherapist-patient privilege to group
therapy in prisons would facilitate trust between the prisoner and
119
Extending the
the group, making rehabilitation more effective.
privilege to group therapy sessions removes the deceptive element
from the rehabilitation process. Additionally, the privilege would
further Alaska’s constitutional goal of effectively rehabilitating
prisoners. Furthering established public policy and removing any
chance that prisoners will be misled into sharing incriminating information in group therapy conveys to the citizenry that the gov120
ernment takes seriously the principles of respect and concern.
VI. STATES THAT INCLUDE GROUP THERAPY IN THE
PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE
Several states have already explicitly included group therapy
in the scope of their evidentiary rule regarding the psychotherapistpatient privilege or have otherwise addressed this issue. Although
a comprehensive survey to compare states that do include group
therapy and those that do not is beyond the scope of this Note,
even preliminary research reveals several states with comprehen-

118. Beaver, 933 P.2d at 1180.
119. Cross, supra note 9, at 198.
120. Id.
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sive privileges that may serve as a model for Alaska in interpreting
Rule 504.
New Jersey is exceptional in that the legislature did more than
simply expand the psychotherapist-patient privilege to include
group therapy. Instead of interpreting the privilege broadly to encompass prison group therapy, the New Jersey legislature passed a
statute affirmatively protecting communications made by an inmate in group therapy. The New Jersey Administrative Code title
10A, section 16-4-4, entitled “Inmate/Therapist Confidentiality,”
states: “Confidential relations between and among mental health
practitioners and individuals or groups in the course of practice are
privileged communications and not to be disclosed to any per121
son.” Although the provision contains a list of exceptions to confidentiality, they are “applicable only in situations which present a
122
clear and imminent danger to the inmate or others.”
Other states have preferred to address the issue by means of
an existing psychotherapist-patient privilege rule. For example, the
Kansas legislature, although it has not addressed the prison population directly, has explicitly included group therapy under the psy123
chotherapist-patient privilege for patients in treatment facilities.
The provision states that the privilege of confidentiality “extends to
individual, family or group therapy under the direction of the
treatment personnel and includes members of the patient’s fam124
ily.” It also states that confidential communications “shall extend
to those persons present to further the interests of the patient in
125
the consultation, examination or interview.”
The Minnesota rules of evidence have also been interpreted
126
broadly. In Minnesota v. Andring, the Minnesota Supreme Court
held that the Minnesota psychotherapist-patient privilege should
be construed to encompass statements made in group psychother127
apy. The court reasoned that
[t]he participants in group psychotherapy sessions are not casual
third persons who are strangers to the psychiatrist/ psychologist/nurse-patient relationship. Rather, every participant has
such a relationship with the attending professional, and, in the

121. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10A, § 16-4.4 (a) (2001). This section was examined
by the Superior Court of New Jersey in In re Inmate-Therapist Confidentiality, 540
A.2d 212 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 1988).
122. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10A, § 16-4.4(b).
123. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-5602 (2000).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. 342 N.W.2d 128 (Minn. 1984).
127. Id. at 133.
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group therapy setting, the participants actually become part of
128
the diagnostic and therapeutic process for co-participants.

The court concluded that
[a]n interpretation which excluded group therapy from the scope
of the psychotherapist-patient privilege would seriously limit the
effectiveness of group psychotherapy as a therapeutic device.
This would be particularly unfortunate because group therapy is
a cost-effective method of psychotherapy in that it allows the
129
therapist to treat a number of patients at the same time.

California has also afforded protection to statements made in
130
group therapy in section 1012 of the California Evidence Code.
Although it did not originally include an explicit reference to group
therapy, section 1012 was amended in 1970 to include “other pa131
The amendment incorporates
tients present at joint therapy.”
only those communications that are “made ‘in confidence’ and ‘by
means which . . . [disclose] the information to no third persons
other than those . . . to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary
for . . . the accomplishment of the purpose for which the psycho132
therapist is consulted.’”
Colorado Statutes section 13-90-107 is entitled “Who may not
133
Section
testify without consent” and includes group therapists.
(g) of the statute expressly states:
Nor shall any person who has participated in any psychotherapy,
conducted under the supervision of a person authorized by law
to conduct such therapy, including but not limited to group therapy sessions, be examined concerning any knowledge gained
during the course of such therapy without consent of the person
134
to whom the testimony sought relates.

128. Id.
129. Id. at 134.
130. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1012 (West 1995).
131. Id.
132. Id. (quoting California Law Revision Commission, Annual Report, 9 CAL.
L. REVISION COMM’N REP. 113, app. 3, at 152 (1969)). The amendment is located
under “Law Revision Commission Comments.” But see In re Pedro M., 96 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 839 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). In this case, a California appellate court created the following caveat: if a juvenile is attending rehabilitation as a condition of
probation, the therapist can be called to testify as to the patient’s progress. Id. at
841. This is solely to assist the court in determining whether the patient is in compliance with the terms of his probation. Id. However, this exception has not been
explicitly applied to individuals who participate in group therapy voluntarily.
Rather, it most likely applies only when group therapy is court-mandated as a
condition to probation.
133. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-90-107(g) (West 2000).
134. Id.
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The Alaska Constitution emphasizes rehabilitation and public
safety as dual goals,135 providing an unambiguous incentive to follow precedent set by other states in including group therapy, especially prison group therapy, under the psychotherapist-patient
privilege. Although the courts have not decided the issues directly,
the commentary to Rule 504 of the Alaska Rules of Evidence references the article written by Cross, a clear endorsement of the ex136
pansion of the privileges to group therapy. The Cross article provides support for protecting statements made in the context of a
prison group therapy session, and there is no legal precedent in
Alaska to undercut its conclusions.
VII. CONCLUSION
Group therapy is becoming an increasingly common form of
137
treatment. Some therapists predict a time when patients will be
138
treated primarily in a group setting. Almost every study on group
therapy, including the Cross article cited by the commentary to
Rule 504 of the Alaska Rules of Evidence, indicates that confidentiality is essential to effective treatment. Several states have responded by regarding group therapy as a protected form of communication. This Note asserts that Alaska should follow suit by
including communications made in group therapy, specifically
communications made in prison group therapy, as part of the psychotherapist-patient privilege.
The Alaska Constitution mandates that Alaska law further the
goals of public safety and rehabilitation of prisoners. Classifying
prison group therapy as an evidentiary privilege furthers both of
these purported goals. Interpreting Alaska law in a manner that
encourages effective rehabilitation of incarcerated persons also has
the benefits of reducing the fiscal burdens associated with a high
rate of recidivism and ensuring that the state’s constitutional goal
of rehabilitation is not undermined. Perhaps more importantly,
protecting confidential communications fosters trust between inmate and therapist and between the citizenry and government.
The participant in group therapy trusts that the communications
will be kept confidential, and the citizenry trusts that the government will further public policy without engaging in practices that
can be construed as deceptive. Including group therapy in the psy-

135.
136.
137.
138.

ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 12.
See discussion, supra Part III.B.
See SLOVENKO, supra note 15, at 119.
Id.
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chotherapist-patient privilege is not simply good public policy—it is
an essential guard against the exploitation of trust.
Christina L. Lewis

